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Abstract: This paper describes how the Indonesian state copes with the 
emergence of a global network of business and civil society as a new, complex 
sovereign over sustainability of an economically very important activity on its 
territory: the production of palm oil. Indonesia is the largest producer and 
exporter of palm oil in the world and plans to double its current production of 
Crude Palm Oil by 2020, mainly by expanding palm oil production. Multinational 
companies and environmental organisations fear that this will lead to further loss 
of forest, biodiversity and peat soils, and herewith increase of greenhouse gas 
emissions. Local NGOs and smallholder movements expect that expansion of 
palm oil production will fuel new land conflicts between communities and 
plantation companies. To map the plural legal order that has evolved as a result 
of non-state actors claiming political legitimacy to define sustainability of palm oil 
production in Indonesia, three types of sovereignties are distinguished (based on 
Comaroff and Comaroff 2009): sovereignties over territory and its inhabitants, 
sovereignties over transactional spheres and commodity flows, and sovereignties 
over people conjoined in faith or culture. To describe the dilemma’s and 
strategies of the Indonesian state in political decision-making over sustainability 
in a plural legal order, the concepts of the cunning state (Randeria 2003) and the 
entrepreneurial state (Andonova 2014) are used, examined and adapted. Our 
analysis suggests that Indonesian state actors both challenge and reproduce the 
global sustainability regime framed and dominated by European non-state 
actors. They do so by competing and cooperating with global private-civil 
networks and by establishing agreements with other states and 
intergovernmental agencies.  
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The 1990s and 2000s are characterized by the emergence of global networks of 
business and civil society actors to develop standards for sustainable production 
of agricultural commodities, like coffee, tea, cacao, cotton, palm oil, soy, etc. 
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Their emergence can be situated against the backdrop of three historical events 
that have shaped world order and are part and expression of a new era of 
globalization: the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, the UN Conference on 
Environment and Development of 1992, and the establishment of the WTO in 
1995. These events paved the way for the emergence of non-state market driven 
systems (NSMD) to promote sustainable production of global agricultural 
commodities (Bernstein and Cashore 2007). The fall of the Berlin Wall created 
political space for non-state actors to manifest themselves as new authorities to 
address top issues on the new global political agenda. One of these issues was 
how to balance agricultural development and environmental sustainability. 
Whereas heads of states politically committed themselves to sustainable 
development, the WTO regime - geared towards reducing trade barriers at the 
border - gave them no legal room to take the lead in developing transnational 
standards and new governance arrangements for sustainable production of global 
commodities. By establishing global standards and roundtables for sustainable 
cropping, private actors filled an institutional void created by inactivity of states 
and intergovernmental agencies to formulate principles and criteria for 
sustainable production of global commodities.  
The new era of globalization fostered a new plural legal order or global legal 
pluralism (Berman 2007). This plural order is characterized by the weakening of 
territorial synchrony of political authority and cultural identity through the 
nation-state (Hajer 2003) and the emergence of non-state actors as new 
sovereigns over transnational flows, territory and cultural identity (Comaroff and 
Comaroff 2009). In the new era of globalization, sovereignty is not any longer 
singular, absolute and all-inclusive but plural, relative and segmented. As a 
result, traditional dimensions of sovereignty that are based on a state-centric 
approach (Risse 2011), lead to new questions. For instance, if international 
sovereignty does not only include seeking acceptance at UN level but also getting 
support from multinational companies and foreign consumers, what does this 
imply? Likewise, what does external sovereignty mean if external non-state 
actors intervene or interfere in agricultural practices and environmental 
processes on the territory of the state? In a similar vein, sovereignty over cross-
border flows or interdependency sovereignty has to be treated in a different way 
if a part of cross-border flows is governed by non-state actors.  
Whereas one could expect that the emergence of global networks of business 
and civil society actors as new sovereigns over sustainability since the 1990s 
would have triggered quite some research to explore how state actors have 
positioned or re-positioned themselves vis-a-vis these global networks, there is 
actually very little scholarly work on this issue. Andonova (2014) concludes that, 
“While there is hardly a disagreement in the literature on the rise of transnational 
actors and new modes of governance, their impact on the state remains debated 
and insufficiently illuminated by empirical research” (p.481). The rise of private 
governance arrangements for sustainable production of global commodities did 
lead to a new body of literature that explains the logics of business and civil 
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society actors in collaborating with each other and creating legitimacy without 
the state (Bäckstrand 2006; Bernstein and Cashore 2007; Pattberg 2005; 
Schouten 2013; Schouten and Glasbergen 2011). Though very insightful, this 
body of literature upholds the notion of a sustainability regime that exclusively 
consists of non-state actors and that is global in the sense of being accepted at 
any place on earth. The use of concepts like Non-State Market Driven systems 
and global private partnerships, have certainly contributed to this notion.  
Very few scholars have analysed the dilemmas and strategies of state actors, 
whether from the South or the North, in coping with the rise of non-state actors 
as new sovereigns over sustainable cropping. For instance, little research has 
been done to explore whether state actors from the South have accepted and 
supported non-state market driven systems to define sustainability of production 
and producers on their territory. Also, hardly any research has been geared 
towards collecting data on interactions between state and non-state actors in 
interpreting and implementing global private standards for sustainable cropping 
at the national or local level. Finally, few scholars have studied new regulatory 
initiatives of states parallel to the implementation of global sustainability 
standards at the national level.  
At a more abstract level, there is a lack of understanding of patterns and 
changes in the way or ways in which state actors cope with the rise of non-state 
actors as new sovereigns over sustainable cropping and what this again implies 
for mapping and conceptualizing transnational sustainability regimes. To increase 
our understanding of these patterns and changes and to contribute to mapping 
and alternative conceptualization of transnational sustainability regimes, we first 
examine different propositions of Andonova (2014) on the changing role of the 
state in environmental governance as a policy arena characterized by a high 
interdependence and complexity and on the engagement of state actors in 
transnational partnerships for sustainability. Second, we review the concepts of 
scattered sovereignties and the cunning state, as coined by Randeria (2003), to 
refer to a new pattern and collaborative strategy of the state in coping with 
norms, policies and other claims of transnational movements and 
intergovernmental agencies over the use of natural resources on the territory of 
the state.  
Our case study is about dilemmas and strategies of the Indonesian state in 
coping with the emergence of non-state sovereigns over sustainability of an 
economically very important activity on its territory: the production of palm oil. 
The case study consists of two parts: the first part is about dilemma’s and 
strategies of the Indonesian state in engaging with the Roundtable on 
Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO) as an initiative of European business and civil 
society to develop principles and criteria for sustainable palm oil. The RSPO was 
formally established in 2004 as a foundation under Swiss law; in 2005 the 
General Assembly ratified the RSPO principles and criteria for sustainable palm 
oil production. The second part is about dilemma’s and strategies of the 
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Indonesian state in seeking support and recognition for the Indonesian standard 
for Sustainable Palm Oil (ISPO) at international, national and local level. The 
ISPO was launched in 2011 by ministerial decree.   
Our first objective is to characterize and explain the (re)positioning of the 
Indonesian state vis-a-vis non-state actors and their network as new sovereigns 
over the production of sustainable palm oil in Indonesia. For this purpose, we 
analyse different or changing notions of sovereignty that are used in discursive 
and network strategies of Indonesian state actors. Our second objective is to 
identify what pattern or change can be identified in the way(s) in which the 
Indonesian state copes with the rise of non-state actors as new sovereigns over 
sustainable palm oil. For this purpose, we use the proposition(s) of Andonova 
(2014) and the concept of the cunning state of Randeria (2003). Our third 
objective is to contribute to a more systematic understanding of the newly 
emerging sustainability regime of palm oil, in which the RSPO and the Indonesian 
state both seek recognition and support for their own standard at the same 
levels but primarily targeting different actors.  
Data on the (re)positioning of the state have been collected through desk study, 
participation in international conferences of the RSPO and GAPKI, and semi-
structured interviews with key informants in the period 2010-2014.  Several 
sources serve as a basis for the descriptive analysis: a desk study of the 
participation of state actors in RSPO working groups and national interpretation 
and implementation teams in 2010 (Hospes and Howard 2010), a study of the 
strategic use of scale frames in the development of global and national principles 
for sustainable palm oil in Indonesia in 2012 (Hospes and Kentin 2014, Kentin 
2012) and studies on the rise of national sustainability initiatives in Brazil and 
Indonesia as copies or competitors of global standards in 2014 (Deike 2014, 
Hospes 2014). The key sources of the latter study are semi-structured interviews 
on the emergence of national standards in Indonesia and Malaysia with 23 key 
players in the palm oil industry in Kuala Lumpur, Singapore and Jakarta. 
The structure of the article is as follows: the next section offers a theoretical 
perspective on how to conceptualize the (re)positioning of the state in complex 
sustainability regimes, based on a review of different propositions on the 
engagement of the state in transnational partnerships on sustainability and the 
concept of the cunning state and scattered sovereignty in plural legal order. Then 
the case study is presented in two parts: the first part describes dilemma’s and 
strategies of the Indonesian state in coping with the emergence of the RSPO as a 
new sovereign and global standard over sustainable palm oil on its territory from 
2005 till 2011; the second part describes dilemma’s and strategies of the 
Indonesian state in seeking support and recognition for the national standard for 
sustainable palm oil at international, national and local level from 2011 onwards. 
The two concluding sections offer an analysis of the case study and draw 
implications for our understanding and conceptualization of a newly emerging 
sustainability regime on palm oil.  
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2. Theorizing on the (re)positioning of the state towards global private 
partnerships 
 
As there is a lack of theorizing on the (re)positioning of the state vis-a-vis  
partnerships of business and civil society at the global level to develop new forms 
of governance and standards for sustainable cropping, we start with reviewing 
literature that tries to explain state participation in public-private partnerships for 
sustainability. Possibly, some explanations of participation of states in such 
partnerships can offer counter explanations on the lack of participation and the 
positioning of the state vis-a-vis global private partnerships for sustainable 
cropping. Drawing on literature, Andonova (2014) has developed six hypotheses 
to explain state participation in transnational hybrid governance of sustainability. 
For each proposition, we propose a counter thesis that could help to understand 
the lack of participation of states in global partnerships for sustainable cropping 
and in particular the positioning of the Indonesian state vis-a-vis the RSPO as a 
non-state sovereign over sustainable palm oil.  
The first proposition of Andonova (2014) is that the participation of states in 
public-private partnerships is evidence of insufficient state capacity and serves as 
a compensatory mechanism to fill governance voids by drawing on the resources, 
competencies and reach of non-state actors (p.485). The counter thesis to 
understand the lack of participation of states in global partnerships for 
sustainable cropping would be that states have, or consider to have, sufficient 
capacity. Her second proposition is that donor states are more likely to initiate 
and participate in transnational partnerships as an alternative means of global 
influence (p.487). The counter proposition to explain lack of participation of 
donor states in global partnerships over sustainable cropping would be that 
donor states consider bilateral and multilateral channels as sufficient to promote 
sustainable cropping in recipient countries. Her third proposition to explain state 
participation in transnational partnerships for the environment is that countries 
that are more consolidated liberal democracies are more likely to engage in 
transnational partnerships (p.489). The counter thesis would be that countries 
that apparently have a more authoritarian regime are less likely to engage in 
transnational partnerships for sustainability. Andonova’s fourth proposition is 
that states are more likely to participate in transnational partnerships if there are 
stronger domestic constituencies of transnational advocacy and/or business 
networks for the environment (p.490). This would suggest that lack of 
participation of states in partnerships for sustainable cropping points at a weak 
domestic constituency of transnational advocacy and/or business networks for 
the environment. Her fifth proposition is that states with a pro-active 
environmental policy and bureaucracy are more likely to initiate or participate in 
transnational environmental partnerships (p.491). The counter proposition is that 
states that do not participate in global partnerships for sustainable cropping are 
characterized by a policy and bureaucracy that is not a front-runner in the field 
of sustainable cropping but rather passive, lagging or reactive. Her sixth 
proposition is that states that are more engaged in international environmental 
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institutions are more likely to participate in transnational environmental 
partnerships (p.492). The counter proposition would be that states that do not 
participate in global partnerships for sustainable cropping, are less likely to be 
actively discussing environmental issues at the international stage in 
intergovernmental regimes.    
In our analysis of the case of the Indonesian state vis-a-vis the RSPO we want to 
assess to what extent the counter propositions are helpful to explain the lack of 
participation of the Indonesian state in the RSPO. But before doing so, we need 
to point at some shortcomings in the propositions of Andonova (2014) to explain 
the participation of states in transnational partnerships. The first problem lies in 
the term ‘participation’: Andonova (2014) assumes participation of states to be 
‘off’ or ‘on’ and somehow equal to (formal) membership. Participation can, 
however, also refer to the status of observer or participant of a conference or 
expert group. The second problem is that Andonova’s analysis helps to identify 
conditions that favour (increasing) state participation in transnational 
partnerships for sustainability but does not give insight into different and 
changing justifications, motivations and strategies of state actors to engage 
more or less with private actors in partnerships. Interestingly, Andonova 
concludes that (increasing) state engagement with non-state actors in 
transnational partnerships is the result of political agency and transformation in 
both domestic and international spheres: it is the combination of 
entrepreneurship of units of government, domestic agency of transnational 
actors and international opportunity structure that explains (increasing) state 
participation in transnational partnerships on sustainability. However, she does 
not give insights in discursive and power struggles between state and 
international non-state actors to negotiate, transfer or share sovereignty over 
sustainability, territory and people. Third, whilst Andonova emphasizes that 
partnerships do ‘not reflect a wholesale shift of authority toward nonstate actors, 
nor are they merely new instruments of traditional state influence’ (p.507), she 
does not show how state actors redefine or selectively use new concepts of 
sovereignty or legitimate political authority.  
Much more than Andonova (2014), Randeria (2003) emphasizes the strategic 
behaviour of the state in developing alliances with non-state actors and 
supranational institutions under processes of globalization. According to Randeria 
(2001), it would be a mistake to consider states as weak or weakening because 
their monopoly over the production of law has been challenged by both 
international institutions and civil society actors. She emphasizes that the state is 
cunning in different aspects: first, it capitalizes on its perceived weakness in 
order to render itself unaccountable to both its citizens and to international 
institutions. Second, the cunning state acts strategically by forging different 
alliances with different non-state actors at different levels. Third, the cunning 
state is selectively implementing norms and policies designed by supranational 
institutions (p.306).  
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Unlike Andonova (2014), Randeria (2013) tries to qualify or conceptualize how 
processes of globalization affect the state as a sovereign. She not only presents 
the state as a networker and negotiator but also as a ‘scattered sovereignty’: as 
a result of processes of transnationalization, privatization and decentralization, 
the state and its powers have been dispersed. States at the national level may 
have lost some of their powers to regional governments or representatives at the 
supranational level. This means that state actors at the national level do not only 
have to cunningly forge coalitions with non-state actors but also have to 
negotiate the implementation of national policies with supranational and local 
governments.  
In different ways, Andonova (2014) and Randeria (2003) explain why states 
participate in transnational partnerships or forge coalitions with non-state actors. 
What we miss in their description and analysis is an understanding and 
exploration of how state actors at the national level perceive sovereignty vis-a-
vis non-state actors and to what extent the emergence of global private forms of 
governance has led to changes or strategic use of their perception of 
sovereignty. To address this shortcoming we would like to first of all distinguish 
three conceptualizations or notions of sovereignty: simple or classical 
sovereignty, complex sovereignty (Grande and Pauly 2005), and plural 
sovereignty (Brauer and Haywood 2010; Comaroff and Comoroff 2009). In the 
simple or classical version, the state considers itself as the supreme authority 
over people and activities within a territory. In the version of the complex 
sovereign, the question is what part of the state is sovereign over what. In the 
notion of plural sovereignty, both state and non-state actors may perceive 
themselves to be sovereign over a space, activity, or some category of people. 
This could lead to concerted action and shared sovereignty but also to conflict 
and contestation between state and non-state actors, also when these actors 
perceive themselves to be sovereigns over different things or people. Soils, 
crops, commodity flows and people are connected to each other, which means 
that claiming sovereignty over, for instance, cropping is somehow to claim 
sovereignty over territory and people. When a state would accept such a claim, it 
also gives up or shares its sovereignty over territory and people.  
Our second proposal is to assume that state actors time and again have to 
consider what perception of sovereignty they want to frame and use in the face 
of emerging transnational partnerships and global private governance. We want 
to explore what notion of sovereignty is part of discursive strategies of state 
actors to come to terms with non-state actors and to rationalize their positioning, 
response and parallel initiatives.  
Our third proposal is to make a distinction between discursive and network 
strategies of state actors in seeing how they cope with global partnerships of 





3. Dilemma’s and strategies of the Indonesian state in governing the production 
of sustainable palm oil 
 
Indonesia is the largest producer and exporter of palm oil in the world and plans 
to double its current production of Crude Palm Oil by 2020, mainly by expanding 
palm oil production. The palm oil sector has been a major contributor to the 
export earnings of Indonesia. The export earnings are estimated at USD 19.11 
billion in 2013 (GAPKI 2014). Palm oil is a major source of government revenue 
from tax (like value-added tax, income tax, land tax and export tax). Since 2006 
the accumulated value of export tax has reached Rp. 80.4 trillion (Indonesian 
Ministry of Finance 2013).   
The global demand for palm oil is huge and expected to grow. Palm oil is a widely 
used source for production of food (cooking oils, margarine, specialty fats, ice 
cream, cookies and chocolates), non-food applications (oleo-chemicals, soaps, 
detergents and cosmetics) and increasingly feedstock for biodiesel. The three 
largest palm-oil importing countries of the world are India, China and the EU. 
The fourth largest consumer of palm oil is Indonesia itself. Its commitment to 
increasingly use palm oil as a biofuel provides an extra incentive for the palm oil 
industry to increase the production.  
The production, expansion and processing of palm oil in Indonesia have not only 
generated enormous economic benefits but also strongly affected ecosystems, 
landscapes and community life. Environmental effects include deforestation, loss 
of biodiversity, greenhouse-gas emissions and spreading of haze due to 
conversion of peatland, clearing of forest and forest fires. Social effects include 
tensions and conflicts between communities and companies over land and 
licences to deforest and produce palm oil.  
The balancing of economic growth, environmental sustainability and social 
development has been a major concern of the Indonesian state since 
independence from the Dutch colonial occupier. Sustainability is presented in the 
1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia as one of the key principles for 
the organization of the national economy.2 Between 1960 and 2010 at least 27 
environmental laws and regulations have been declared by the Indonesian state. 
These are all confirmed in the 2011 decree of the Ministry of Agriculture to 
launch the standard for Indonesian Sustainable Palm Oil (ISPO). However, the  
Indonesian state was not the first to launch a sustainability standard that is 
specifically about palm oil production. Some six years before this launch, non-
                                                          
2 Article 33(4) of the Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia: “The organization of the national 
economy shall be based on economic democracy that upholds the principles of solidarity, efficiency 
along with fairness, sustainability, keeping the environment in perspective, self-sufficiency, and 
that is concerned as well with balanced progress and with the unity of the national economy” 
(certified English translation downloaded from 
http://www.humanrights.asia/countries/indonesia/laws/uud1945_en as per April 4 of 2014). 
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state actors convened by the Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO) ratified 
principles and criteria for the production of sustainable palm oil at their General 
Assembly in 2005. The RSPO is an initiative of WWF and European demand-side 
actors of the global palm oil industry, particularly Unilever (Schouten 2013: 64). 
These non-state actors did not approach governments of Indonesia and Malaysia 
as the major palm oil producing countries to join and support their initiative but 
invited associations of palm oil growers from these two countries to become 
members.  
Taking the launch of the RSPO and ISPO standards as two critical moments in the 
changing governance landscape of sustainable palm oil, we will now discuss 
major challenges and dilemmas of the Indonesian state in governing the 
production of sustainable palm oil. First, we will focus on the period between 
2005 and 2011 in which the RSPO was still the only standard on sustainable 
palm oil. Then, we will discuss the period in which the ISPO co-exists with the 
RSPO standard. The challenges and dilemmas of the Indonesian state during the 
first period are: Shall we ignore the RSPO as a new form of governance for palm 
oil, or try to get actively engaged with this form? Shall we embrace the RSPO 
standard and support its implementation at the national and local level in 
Indonesia? How to get engaged with the RSPO and support its implementation if 
state actors cannot become member and be given decision-making power in the 
RSPO?  
The challenges and dilemma’s of the Indonesian state during the second period 
are: How to gain credibility for the ISPO at the international level in a situation in 
which the RSPO has been accepted by many non-state actors and European 
governments as the ‘worldwide standard’ for sustainable palm oil and outcome of 
a multi-stakeholder process involving business and NGOs: shall we primarily seek 
understanding and recognition with business or rather government actors? How 
to organize the implementation of the ISPO at the local level in a general context 
of decentralisation and in places where licenses to produce palm oil have been 
allocated in a non-legal way? How to organize concerted action in promoting the 
ISPO at international and national level through the ministry of agriculture when 
also three other ministries (trade, environment, forestry) are involved? Finally, 
what to do about the RSPO standard? 
3.1 Coping with the RSPO  
 
A first dilemma of the government of Indonesia after the formal establishment of 
the RSPO in 2004 was to decide whether or not to engage with this private form 
of global governance. Not engaging would provide less opportunities to influence 
the debate. Engaging could be seen as accepting the leading role and political 
authority of the RSPO in defining and promoting sustainable palm oil in 
Indonesia.  
The European initiators of the RSPO had excluded the government of Indonesia 
from the preparation of the RSPO and its formal establishment. In spite of this, 
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the government decided not to disqualify or ignore the RSPO but to get as much 
as possible engaged in organizing public debate on sustainable palm oil through 
the RSPO as a multi-stakeholder platform and in discussing the interpretation 
and implementation of the RSPO standard in Indonesia.  
Every year since 2003 the RSPO organizes an international conference or RT 
(Roundtable) to discuss problems and challenges in the palm oil sector. The first 
one (RT1) was held in Kuala Lumpur, the second one (RT2) in Jakarta. Since the 
formal establishment of the RSPO in 2004, every RT is followed by the General 
Assembly meeting. Whereas the international conference is not open for a wider 
public, only members of the RSPO are allowed to participate in the decision-
making process at the General Assembly.3 The Indonesian Minister of Agriculture 
delivered the opening address of RT2. The chair of the organizing committee of 
the conference of RT2 was Dr Rosediana Suharto, also chair of the Indonesian 
Palm Oil Commission (IPOC) as a special commission falling under the auspices 
of the Ministry of Agriculture.4 From that RT onwards, the Indonesian Ministry of 
Agriculture and particularly its officials from the Directorate General for Estates 
and IPOC, would be regular contributors to the RT, certainly when held in 
Indonesia, by providing key-notes and other presentations and chairing sessions.  
A second dilemma for the Indonesian state was whether or not to engage in the 
interpretation of the generic RSPO principles for the Indonesian situation. 
Engaging could provide opportunities to better adapt the generic RSPO standard 
to the Indonesian situation and insert own frames of sustainability. At the same 
time, such engagement would again imply recognizing the RSPO as the highest 
political authority and decision-making model.  
The government of Indonesia decided not to refrain from engaging with non-
state actors at RSPO meetings on this issue. Representatives from six Indonesian 
ministries participated in the multi-stakeholder team for the national 
interpretation of the RSPO principles and criteria for Indonesia, that was initiated 
in 2007 (Hospes and Kentin 2014). Representatives from the Indonesian Ministry 
of Agriculture joined the RSPO multi-stakeholder working group that was initiated 
in the same year to discuss “the best approach in co-ordinating and expediting 
the Smallholders Task Force (STF) related activities specifically for Indonesia”.5  
A third dilemma was whether to adopt and use the RSPO standard in agricultural 
extension to palm oil growers, particularly independent smallholders, or rather a 
complex of Indonesian environmental and agricultural laws and regulations. As a 
follow-up of their work in the Smallholders Task Force, the Ministry of Agriculture 
signed a memorandum of understanding with the RSPO in 2009 to collaborate in 
                                                          
3 Participation in the conference is not free but requires payment of a registration fee. Non-
members can be given access to the venue of the General Assembly as observers. 
4 See http://rspo.org/files/pdf/RT2/Proceedings/Day%201/Welcome%20Address%20(DB).pdf and  
http://www.rspo.org/files/pdf/RT2/Invitation%20to%20RT2%20(IPOC).pdf, downloaded 24 March 
of 2014. 




training trainers of smallholders.6 In two periods, a total of 40 local facilitators 
(Facilitator Daerah) were instructed how to train smallholders on the RSPO 
principles and criteria.7 More than 400 smallholders were then trained by these 
agricultural extension officers on complying with RSPO principles and criteria. 
In spite of the contributions of high officials of the Ministry of Agriculture to the 
RSPO international conferences, the RSPO smallholder task force and the RSPO 
national interpretation team for Indonesia, and the training of agricultural 
extension officers to train smallholders in RSPO principles and criteria, the 
Ministry of Agriculture decided to prepare the Indonesian standard for 
Sustainable Palm Oil (ISPO). In his keynote speech at RT8 of the RSPO in 2010 
the Indonesian Minister of Agriculture announces the ISPO. The official argument 
is that due to the voluntary character of the RSPO it will take too long to realize 
widespread and effective adoption of sustainable practices in Indonesia, where 
only a fraction of palm oil growers are members of the RSPO (Suharto 2010).  
3.2 Dilemmas and strategies after the launch of ISPO 
 
The Indonesian standard for sustainable palm oil was launched in 2011 with the 
aim “to improve the competitiveness of Indonesian palm oil on the global market 
and contribute to the objective set by the President of the Republic of Indonesia 
to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and draw attention to environmental issues” 
(ISPO 2014). The ISPO standard is based on existing Indonesian laws and 
legislation and, in contrast with the RSPO, is mandatory for all Indonesian oil 
palm producers. The certification itself is granted by third party auditing bodies, 
who assess the compliance of companies with the ISPO standard. Despite its 
mandatory character, the ISPO commission is facing several challenges for which 
it uses a range of - discursive and networking - coping strategies.  
The first - and probably biggest - challenge for ISPO is to seek international 
recognition for their certification. On the global level ISPO certified palm oil is not 
(yet) accepted as a preferred standard. With the RSPO as their competing 
standard, which is global and developed through a lengthy and extensive multi-
stakeholder process, many demand-side actors view this standard as the only 
credible one (several interviewees, 2014). A number of strategies is used by the 
Indonesian government to ensure international recognition of the ISPO standard.  
To attain international recognition the ISPO commission uses a networking 
strategy, by approaching importing countries directly and ask for bilateral 
support and approval. A team of representatives from the ISPO commission and 
GAPKI (the Indonesian palm oil producer organization) visited governments, 
NGOs and businesses in Europe, the US, China and India. While China and India 
are thus far not particularly interested in buying certified sustainable palm oil, 
many countries in Europe exclusively focus on RSPO to make their imports more 
                                                          
6 Source: Presentation by Asril Darussamin entitled “Challenges Faced by Smallholders to 
Implement SPO Initiatives.  
7 Source: interview with Asril Darussamin on 18 February of 2014. 
12 
 
sustainable. The ISPO commission so far failed to achieve explicit support from 
European governments for their standard. According a former high official of the 
Ministry of Agriculture, who has been part of the Indonesian delegation to 
present the ISPO in the USA, the presentation of ISPO was well received by 
India, China and Pakistan.  
Despite the tense relationship with the RSPO, continuous efforts are made to 
establish relationships between the ISPO and RSPO standards. The RSPO and the 
ISPO commission of the Indonesian Ministry of Agriculture signed an agreement 
in 2013 which resulted in a joint study to explore the differences and similarities 
between the two standards. An independent certifier which was approved by 
RPSO and ISPO is conducting this study which is part of the sustainable palm oil 
(SPO) initiative led by UNDP. Smallholder development and GHG emission 
reduction are the specific focus of this initiative. A possible aim of the study is to 
develop a joint auditing process to reduce duplicity of efforts. However, the 
executive director of the ISPO commission claims this is impossible as the ISPO 
standard is an implementation of state law and can therefore never be combined 
with market-driven certification. Other stakeholders, including the executive 
director of GAPKI, firmly believe in this strategy. The RSPO and ISPO commission 
are negotiating about the possibility of co-recognition of each other’s standards 
(interview data, 2014). 
Besides this networking strategy, the Indonesian government also uses 
discursive strategies to attain international recognition for ISPO certified palm oil. 
The main discursive strategy is to present Indonesia as the sovereign power that 
has the exclusive right to regulate issues within their territorial boundaries. The 
ISPO commission presents the standard as being the only ‘real’ one, because it is 
based on national laws and legislation and therefore is mandatory. Their main 
concern is the equal treatment of Indonesia as a sovereign state who has the 
final say about the palm oil production within its own borders. It is made clear by 
the ISPO commission that Indonesia is not willing to bow to foreign pressure for 
environmental protection at the cost of their own producers, be it smallholders or 
big companies. The second discursive strategy is a reaction to criticism that 
ISPO, unlike RSPO, is not developed in a multi-stakeholder process. Therefore, 
the ISPO commission included multi-stakeholder elements into the presentation 
and execution of the ISPO policy. For example, in the ISPO assessment 
committee Indonesian NGOs and palm oil growers are represented. This 
committee checks the audits done by the independent certification bodies and 
decides whether or not a company is eligible for certification. 
The second challenge relates to the implementation of the ISPO standard in 
Indonesia. The aim of the Ministry of Agriculture is to have all companies ISPO 
certified by the end of 2014. However, a recent article in the Jakarta Post (March 
3, 2014, p.13) states that only 40 out of roughly 2500 plantations have secured 
a government-issued certificate on sustainability and another 153 applied for 
certification. Executive director of the ISPO commission, Dr Rosediana Suharto, 
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says in the article that the commission would not revise the deadline or launch 
specific initiatives to push the remaining plantations to apply for the certification. 
At the national level the ministry of agriculture is confronted with a lack of 
resources, while at the local level enforcement of the rules is difficult because of 
the high level of corruption in Indonesia. To deal with these challenges the ISPO 
commission for now its limits its efforts to plantations rather than smallholders 
because these are better organized and hence easier to certify. Currently there is 
a task-force which develops an ISPO scheme particularly for smallholders, 
however the progress of this is currently unclear. Decentralization efforts have 
resulted in more powerful local government officials. National regulations are 
therefore subject to local interpretation and implementation. Therefore the 
Agricultural Ministry provides trainings for auditors within certification bodies to 
inform them about the ISPO standard. During audits these certification bodies 
will check if required permits for the palm oil operations exist. Whether or not 
these permits have been achieved rightfully is not checked. However, corruption 
is a big problem in issuing licences, permits and ownership titles. ISPO 
certification does not focus on tackling corruption, but the ISPO commission 
states it will report any case of corruption to the national anti-corruption agency 
KPK. However, KPK also is faced with a lack of resources and does not prioritize 
comparatively small corruption cases in land conflict issues. 
The third challenge regards the position of ISPO within the Ministry of Agriculture 
and within the Indonesian government apparatus as a whole. The structure, 
objective and power of the ISPO are unclear to many stakeholders of the palm oil 
sector. The ISPO commission has been established by the Ministry of Agriculture, 
yet stakeholders report that the commission is lacking on the organigram of the 
Ministry. Being established by the Ministry of Agriculture rather than by different 
ministries to form an interdepartmental commission, the ISPO commission is not 
in the position to coordinate between the ministries. Whereas the executive 
director of the ISPO presents the standard as a national and Indonesian 
initiative, we could not find evidence of other ministries being involved in the 
drafting of the ISPO. Also, it is not clear to what extent high officials of other 
ministries share the official view of the Ministry of Agriculture that the ISPO is 
going to compensate for the weaknesses of the RSPO standard. 
   
 
4. Analysis  
 
The strategies of the Indonesian state to cope with the emergence of the RSPO 
as a non-state global form of governance to define principles and criteria for 
sustainable palm oil on its territory suggest that these strategies cannot be 
understood in terms of participation or not, but in terms of positioning and 
repositioning, or countermoves to moves of non-state actors. Using Andonova’s 
(2014) propositions and our counter theses to analyse the positioning of the 




First, it is not very helpful to understand and conceptualize the participation of 
the Indonesian state in consultation processes organized by the RSPO as 
reflecting insufficient capacities of the state to alone address environmental and 
social effects of palm oil production. The participation of the Indonesian state in 
international conferences and working groups organized by the RSPO has to be 
seen as a coping strategy of the Indonesian government that was not invited or 
allowed to become member of the RSPO but very eager to discuss the 
implementation and interpretation of the RSPO principles for Indonesia and in 
particular for smallholders.  
 
Second, our case study of the positioning of the Indonesian state vis-a-vis the 
RSPO as a private form of governance suggests that this positioning may change 
over time from active engagement and recognition of the RSPO as a multi-
stakeholder platform to distancing and taking own initiatives. The launch of the 
ISPO has not only created new tensions between non-state actors organized 
through the RSPO and the Indonesian government but also between European 
governments and the Indonesian government. European governments, 
particularly the Netherlands, have expressed strong policy support for the RSPO 
as a form of private or industry-based governance over sustainable palm oil. The 
government of Indonesia has launched the ISPO to meet its international 
commitments to reduction of greenhouse gas emissions and to improve the 
competitiveness of Indonesian palm on the global market. To seek recognition at 
the international level, the government of Indonesia has adopted a government-
to-government (G2G) approach, visiting tens of palm oil importing countries to 
seek understanding and recognition for the ISPO from governments. Reportedly, 
European and USA governments kindly listened to the presentation of the ISPO 
but did not applaud or embrace this standard whereas Asian governments 
expressed support.  
 
Our case study shows that while the Indonesian government at first contributed 
to the RSPO process, thereby implicitly recognizing the RSPO as a legitimate 
political authority, their more recent strategy is to present Indonesia as the sole 
sovereign power that has the exclusive right to regulate issues within their 
territorial boundaries based on their democratic mandate. With the latter 
strategy, the government explicitly disqualifies any sovereignty the RSPO might 
claim in regulating palm oil production and industry.  
 
The strategies of the Indonesian government, however, are slightly ambiguous or 
janus-faced. While the government recently claims to have the exclusive right to 
govern palm oil issues within their boundaries, it is also in active search for 
credibility and international recognition. Therefore, the government also employs 
a networking strategy at the international level in which officials try to connect 
with governments of importing countries (G2G strategy). Also, the government 
employs a strategy at the national level in which they include multiple 
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stakeholders into the implementation structure of the ISPO standard to increase 
their national and international credibility. 
 
This means that the concept of ‘scattered sovereignty’ (Randeria 2003) is quite 
useful to understand how the Indonesian state copes with the emergence of the 
RSPO as a new sovereign over sustainability: our case study shows that the 
Indonesian state cunningly forges coalitions with non-state actors but also has to 
negotiate the implementation of the national standard with importing countries 
and domestically with local authorities. At the same time, our case study brings 
to the fore a new dimension of the concept of scattered sovereignty and the 
cunning state for that matter: sovereignty is used by the ‘cunning’ state as a 
discursive tool to pursue specific goals and to network with some, not with 
others. Discursive and networking strategies of the state may or may not reflect 
the same notion of sovereignty.  
 
 
5. Conclusion and discussion  
 
The initiative of the government of Indonesia to launch an Indonesian standard 
for sustainable palm oil and to seek international recognition for this standard 
marks a fundamental shift in the global governance landscape of sustainable 
palm oil. The era in which the RSPO was the single and world-wide standard for 
sustainable palm oil has ended. Not only has this created new tensions between 
non-state actors and the government of Indonesia but also between the 
Indonesian government and European governments. Possibly, we are not only 
witnessing the end of the hegemony of a coalition of environmental NGOs and 
European demand-side business actors over sustainability of palm oil in 
Indonesia but also the start of wider policy struggles between European 
governments and Asian governments on what governance model for promoting 
sustainable palm oil should prevail.  
 
As a result of the initiative of the government of Indonesia to launch a national 
standard, the governance landscape of sustainable palm oil has become much 
more complex, certainly now that Malaysia is following the example of Indonesia. 
At the heart of the matter stands a conflict about who is the sovereign over 
sustainable palm oil. Analytically, we can make a distinction between sovereignty 
over territory, transnational flows of goods, people and culture, but practically or 
politically speaking the wicked problem of ‘overlapping sovereignties’ (Randeria 
2007) remains: claiming sovereignty over one of these tangible or less tangible 
things is to claim sovereignty over another. Our prediction is that ambiguous 
alliances and ambivalent use of sovereignty will increasingly evolve as 
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